Abstract-SDN network's policies are updated dynamically at a high pace. As a result, conflicts between policies are prone to occur. Due to the large number of switches and heterogeneous policies within a typical SDN network, detecting those conflicts is a laborious and challenging task. This paper presents two-fold contributions. First, we devise an offline method for detecting unmatched OpenFlow rules, i.e., those rules that are never fired. At the heart of our scheme is a formal approach for predicting the packet's path inside a SDN network. In this perspective, we proffer the taxonomy: invalid and irrelevant anomalies for the unmatched rules. Second, we introduce a new set of definitions for the intra-anomalies, which might occur when using the OpenFlow rule's multi-action feature. We provide some comprehensive experimental results that show the feasibility of our approach and its ability to scale within large SDN network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Packet forwarding in modern networks is a complex process that involves several devices such as switches, routers and firewall operating with different protocols and configurations. A local device's policy might be conflicting with another appliance's policies. The task of management of network middleboxes manually has been proven to be complex, error-prone, costly and inefficient for many large-networked organizations [1] . For instance, more than 1000 configuration errors have been observed in border gateway protocol (BGP) routers [2] . A single misconfigured router is able to compromise the correct operation of the whole Internet for hours [2] , [3] . Meanwhile, human errors are known to be the most common contributor to network downtime. Those errors are responsible for 50 and up to 80 percent of network device outages [4] . Errors typically include loops, suboptimal routing, black holes and access control violations. Moreover, manual troubleshooting in large networks is often almost impossible. Software-defined network (SDN) paradigm addresses these challenges by automating the network control process. SDN separates the control plane from the forwarding devices via a standard protocol called "OpenFlow" [5] . SDN controller has control over the state of the network, thus, it possible to analyze network misconfiguration in a centralized manner. Various methods have been presented to deal with misconfiguration challenges. Those methods fall under two main categories: rule-based verification and log-based verification. Rule-based verification examines the semantics of the rules for detecting policy violation. For instance, when it comes to firewall misconfiguration, AlShaer and Hamed [6] propose a tool called Firewall policy advisor. In the same context, Rezvani and Aryan [7] resorted to propositional logic to detect policy violations between a new inserted rule and the combination of existing rules. The other family of approaches, log-based methods, detects policy violations based on mining the network appliance's logs [8] , [9] . Furthermore, policy checking could also be categorized based on the different aspects that focus on the Intra-and Interdevices. For example, the work of Al-Shaer and Hamed [6] and Rezvani and Aryan [7] try to detect misconfiguration on the single device, namely, firewall rule anomalies. On the other hand, both VeriFlow [10] and the work of Kazemian et al. [11] are able to check policy violation among connected devices in the network. In this paper, we tackle rule-based approach for detecting misconfigurations in SDN, which supports both multi-action and single-action Openflow rules. We catalogue the main contributions of this paper as follows:
• A new definition for the intra-anomalies has been described for the OpenFlow with multi-action feature. This generalizes the state-of-the-art intra-anomalies definitions, which are only based on single-action feature.
• We introduce the nomenclature irrelevant and invalid rule anomalies for the case of unmatched rules.
• The detection method supports parallelization by generating completely disjoint queries.
• Our query-based proposed method covers whole policy segments, and therefore it is more efficient than the pingbased troubleshooting methods that operate on a packet basis.
• Our suggested method, in contrast to Netplumber and VeriFlow, considers intra-rule dependency in flow tables [12] .
• In contrast to the Header Space Analysis (HSA), our method is a priority-based method which makes it compatible with the OpenFlow protocol.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a comprehensive overview over the stateof-the-art. Section III discusses our formal tracing method.
In Section IV, the OpenFlow rules' anomalies definition and detection are explained, and finally the evaluation results are presented in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, a significant amount of research has addressed network policy conflict analysis. A notable work is due to Kazemian et al. [11] who introduced a real time policy checking tool based on HSA [11] called NetPlumber. In contrast to the HSA, NetPlumber checks the real time network traffic incrementally. The authors proposed a new formal language to express policy checks, which is fast enough for use as a real-time traffic monitoring. NetPlumber is able to not only detect loops and other invariant violations, but also check sophisticated policy's failures such as: "Web traffic from A to B should never pass through waypoints C or D between 9am and 5pm." Although Netplumber proposes a real-time method for detecting all typical violations, it ignores intra-rule dependencies in flow tables. Both HSA and Netplumber are time-consuming and thus are not suitable for networks with high rate of up and down links. Therefore, for Netplumber, which focuses on the real-time environment, it is an important weakness. Mai et al. [13] tackle the misconfiguration problem by formal analysis of data plane state rather than diagnosing bugs in the control plane. This approach is able to not only detect the "invisible" bugs in routing configuration files, but also unifies the analysis regardless of the many implementations and protocols. The authors try to develop a tool to collect the network devices' Forwarding Information Bases (FIBs) and detect some typical failure by the Boolean functions. The tool is called "Anteater" and can check reachability and consistency of rules among the routers and loops in networks. It combines the data plane and invariants into instances of a Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT), and uses an SAT solver to perform analysis.
Al-Shaer and Al-Haj [9] present a configuration verification tool, which is called "FlowChecker," to validate, analyze and enforce at the run-time OpenFlow end-to-end configuration across multiple federations. It exploits FlowVisor [14] , which partitions the network resources into smaller segments. FlowChecker is able to detect both intra-switch and interswitch misconfiguration in a path of OpenFlow forwarding devices across the same or different infrastructure. It uses Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) to encode the flow tables. Afterwards, it tries to model the inter-connected OpenFlow switches' network via model checker techniques. The method is useful for verifying policy consistency. In addition, validating the configuration correctness in different switches and controllers across the distinct OpenFlow infrastructure also benefited from this tool. Furthermore, it is convenient for debugging reachability and predicting the impact of new policy on the network. Config-Checker [15] is a novel method that models the end-to-end behavior of access control configuration, including routers, IPsec, firewalls and NAT for Unicast and multicast packets. Config-Checker deals primary with security aspects in firewalls. The novelty of the method is the creation of symbolic model checker and its optimization. The model represents the network as a state machine defined by the packet header, and its location on the network hops. Packet header, packet location and the policy define the transitions in the state machine.
Sherwood et al. [14] present a logical isolation approach in one hardware switch, which is compatible with commodity switching chipsets and does not require the use of programmable hardware such as FPGAs or network processors. They develop a tool, which is called "FlowVisor." The tool uses the OpenFlow protocol for applying the policy isolation in the target network and is located between controller and forwarding devices. FlowVisor is a special purpose OpenFlow controller that acts as a transparent proxy between OpenFlow switches and multiple OpenFlow controllers. It prepares segments of network devices, controls them independently in separate logical controller, and guarantees the isolation. FlowVisor can create variant segments based on the combination of the forwarding devices or its ports, packet's address or packet's protocol [16] . However, it has a latency and overhead on the control channel due to use of an additional TLS connection. Son et al. devised a model checking system called "FloVer" [17] , a formal approach to prove the conformance of dynamically produced OpenFlow flow rules against nonbypass security properties, including those with set and go to table actions. The authors demonstrate how to translate OpenFlow rules and network security policies into an assertion set, which can then be processed and verified by an SMT solver. This method uses the Yices SMT solver, which is integrated into NOX, a popular OpenFlow network controller. This system verifies that the aggregate of OpenFlow network's policies does not breach the network security and integrity of its policies.
III. ROUTING PREDICTION BASED ON INTERSECTION METHOD
Policies in the SDN-based network are changed frequently. Clarifying the side effects of new policies in a complicated network has always been vital for network administrators. Therefore, proposing an accurate approach for parsing the complex network by an input traffic is of utmost importance. In this Section, we will present a tracing method that is able to predict the route of both single and multiple input packets. The method is compatible with pipeline tables, group tables and required action as stated in OpenFlow 1.1.0 [12] .
A. Tracing Function
The function "T" defines a recursive trace route process from a specific node for a single packet. In each iteration, the function detects which rule matches the input packet and detects the next hop consequently.
(1) X denotes a node, which is a set of rules, X : {R 1x , R 2x , · · ·}. Each rule contains a matching condition C and an action A, which refers to a next hop in the form of R ix : (C ix , A ix ). The matching condition C includes the ingress port and packet's header properties such as source IP, destination IP and destination port. q denotes a query representing a packet. The function T returns the next node as a result. The recursive process is terminated whenever the next node is a client or when the drop action is met. Therefore, via the tracing function, we can predict the destination of the input query. i and j are used to denote the rule's order in the flow Foreach rule in Rules 3.
If Query ∧ rule.Condition 4.
Route ← rule.Action 5.
If rule.Action = Client Or rule.Action = Drop 6.
Return Route 7.
End If 8.
Tracing Function(rule.Action, Query, Route) 9.
End If 10. End For
B. Transfer Function
The function T A→B (Q) proposes a packet transit process from a node A to node B via a precise input (Q). The matching process relies on the Raining 2D-Box model [18] . In this model, the input is checked sequentially against the higher priority rules. The unmatched part of input is checked further with the next rules.
Equation 2 gives the formal definition of the transfer function. According to Fig. 1 and Equation 2, the results of the transfer function can be described as follows: 
As it can be clearly seen in Fig. 1 , the node E is reached via two branches. The recursive expression of joining of these branches can be described as follows:
In addition, by using the transfer function it is possible to check whether the path taken by the query passes through a specific node or not. As an example and according to Fig. 1 , from the result of T A→D (q 4 ), it is possible to check whether the query path meets node B or C. The result is shown as follows:
In order to check all possible routes from a source node via an input query, we shall use the Depth First Search (DFS) algorithm.
C. Reachability Checking
As aforementioned, reachability checking is one of the critical troubleshooting operations for network administrators in complex networks. According to the tracing function (Equation 1) and the transfer function (Equation 2), it is possible to check whether a precise host can connect to a specific host. The reachability checking method is defined based on the second-order logic (Equation 3). The predicate ϕ has been declared for checking the reachability of hop Y from hop X by a query Q. X and Y denote nodes, which are set of rules.
Since the proposed method is an offline method, we assume that whenever we are faced with If the last hop in Hops = Destination Hop 5.
Return Based on the formal methods defined in Section III, in this Section, we present an offline anomaly detection approach. The rationale of the approach we propose is to generate queries that contain all possible packets that could pass through the network from all ingress switches. Subsequently, our anomaly detection algorithms are called for detecting possible policy conflicts.
A. Generating Queries
As mentioned previously, our anomaly detection method needs to check all possible packets that might enter the network via the ingress switches. By definition, ingress switches are gateways between the end clients and rest of the network. Fig. 3 sketches an example illustrating the ingress switch concept. In the ingress switch's flow table, the first rule is Fig. 3 : Ingress switch in network considered as one query. In order to generate the second query, we subtract the next rule from the previous rules (here the previous rules is merely the first rule). This process continues for the rest of the rules in a flow table of an ingress switch. The query generation operation is described in Equation 4 . The queries, which are generated based on a specific flow table, are completely disjoint. Therefore, the queries can be executed in parallel without any specific order.
. . .
Throughout calling transfer function, each rule in the whole network (whether or not it is in the ingress switches) will only be marked as a matched rule if it is matched with at least one query or subquery. At the end of the process, the unmatched rules are further investigated in order to discover the possible anomaly that caused the unmatch. The latter question will be addressed in the next subsection.
B. OpenFlow Rule Anomaly
There are several reasons that cause one rule to be never matched by all possible queries. Al-Shaer and Hamed [6] introduced four types of pairwise anomalies among rules in a firewall: shadowing, correlation, generalization and redundancy. Rezvani and Aryan [7] defines three more anomalies, namely, total shadowing, total generalization and total redundancy. Moreover, inter-anomalies, which might occur in distributed firewalls, have been defined by Al-Shaer and Hamed [19] and categorized as shadowing anomaly and redundant anomaly. Since the OpenFlow-based rules consist of two main parts, Conditions and Actions, the same categorization has been used for intra-anomalies among flow tables' rules. However, as explained by [20] , flow tables' rules might have more than one action, i.e., multi-action. Thus, we shall propose a new expression for the OpenFlow rules' intra-anomalies that supports multi-action. To the best of our knowledge, such an aspect was not investigated in the literature before. Therefore, the unmatched rules can be a result of intra or inter-anomalies, which will be defined in greater detail in what follows.
1) Intra-Anomaly for single-action and multi-action:
An intra-anomaly takes place between rules in the same table. According to the [6] and [7] , these types of anomalies are categorized into 7 groups. We shall use the bit wise format defined in [7] in order to re-write rules and packets. The formal specification of OpenFlow rule anomalies are put forward as follows. a) Shadow Anomaly: If rule R j matches all the packets that match rule R i , R ipriority < R jpriority and the two rules have different actions, R i is shadowed by previous rule R j . Formally, rule R i is shadowed by rule R j if the following condition holds:
As per Equation 5 , rule R i is shadowed by the rule R j for the group of actions, which are true in (A i ⊕ A j ).
b) Correlation Anomaly: Two rules in a flow table are correlated if they have different actions, and the first rule matches some packets that match the second rule and also the second rule matches some packets that match the first rule. Formally, rule R i and R j have a correlation anomaly if the following condition holds:
As described by Equation 6 , rule R i and rule R j have correlation for the group of actions that are true in (A i ⊕ A j ). c) Generalization Anomaly: Rule R j is a generalization of a preceding Rule R i if they have different actions, R ipriority < R jpriority and if the rule R i can match all the packets that match the rule R j . Formally, rule R i is generalization of rule R j if the following condition holds:
According to Equation 7 , rule R i and rule R j have generalization for the group of actions that which are true in (A i ⊕ A j ).
d) Redundant Anomaly: Rule R i is redundant to Rule R j if they have same actions, and if the rule R j can match all the packets that match the rule R i . Formally, rule R i is redundant to rule R j if the following condition holds:
As described by Equation 8 , rule R i and rule R j have redundancy for the group of actions that are true in (A i ∧ A j ). e) Total Shadow Anomaly: Rule R i is totally shadowed by a set of previous rules if the previous rules match all the packets that match the rule R i , and the rule R i has different action from the previous rules. Formally, rule R i is totally shadowed by rules {R 1 · · · R k } if the following condition holds:
According to the Equation 9, rule R i and rules in the set: {R 1 · · · R k } have total shadow for the group of actions that are true in ((
f) Total Redundant Anomaly:
Rule R i is a total redundant of a set of rules if the set of rules match all the packets that match the rule R i , and the rule R i and the set of rules have the same action. Formally, rule R i is a total redundant of a set of rules {R 1 · · · R k } if the following condition holds:
As per Equation 10, rule R i and rules in the set: {R 1 · · · R k } have total redundancy for the group of actions that are true in
g) Total Generalization Anomaly:
Rule R i is a total generalization of a set of further rules if the rules match all the packets that match the rule R i , and the rule R i has different action from the rules. Formally, rule R i is a total generalization of a set of rules {R 1 · · · R k } if the following condition holds:
As described by Equation 11 , rule R i and rules in the set: {R 1 · · · R k } have total generalization for the group of actions that are true in ((
2) Inter-Anomaly:
According to the nomenclature proposed in [19] , at any point along the path of a given flow, a preceding switch is called an upstream hop whereas a following switch is called a downstream hop. Among two forwarding devices, when one or more rules in upstream shadows the specific rule of a downstream hop matched by one or a group of the packet, an Inter-Anomaly takes a place. Note that in this section, we assume that the flow tables are intra-anomaly free. The AlShaer and Hamed [19] categorize the inter-anomalies in four groups. In contrast to [19] , this paper defines four types of inter-anomalies in a different way, which are the root cause of unmatched rules. a) Subset Rule Anomaly: A subset rule anomaly occurs if all packets that can be matched with the unmatched rule in a downstream hop, matches with an upstream hop's rule. Formally, rule R i has a subset rule anomaly with rule R j if the following conditions hold true:
In Equations 12-14, U pstream() represents a predicate that returns true if the input hop is an upstream hop. ϕ is regarded as a predicate, which is described in Equation 3 . b) Superset Rule Anomaly: A superset rule anomaly occurs if all packets that matched with an upstream hop's rule, can be matched by an unmatched rule in a downstream hop. Formally, rule R i has a superset rule anomaly with rule R j if the following condition holds:
c) Partial Rule Anomaly: A partial rule anomaly occurs if just parts of packets, that can be matched with an unmatched rule in a downstream hop, are matched by an upstream hop's rule. Formally, rule R i has a superset rule anomaly with rule R j if the following condition holds:
d) Irrelevant Rule Anomaly: The irrelevant rule anomaly occurs if all packets that can be matched with the unmatched rule are matched by different rules, and the paths for each packet are expected by the network administrator. Formally, rule R i known as an irrelevant rule if the following condition holds:
) Ingress represents a set of all ingress switches in the network. R is regarded as a set of all unmatched rules. C rule means rule's condition. Ex P ath refers to a set of expected paths, which are defined by the network administrator. T () represents the transform function, which is described in Equation 2.
Finally, irrelevant() denotes a predicate, which returns true if the input is an irrelevant rule.
3) Invalid Rule Anomaly: If the unmatched rule does not match with any subset of the input queries, it is considered as an invalid rule in the flow table. This anomaly is defined in Equation 16 .
As expressed by Equation 16 , R represents a set of unmatched rules and each member of this set is regarded as r, which is formed as a condition C r and an action A r . Q means a set of input queries. Finally, invalid(r) amounts to a predicate, which returns true if the input rule r is recognized as an invalid rule.
C. Anomaly Detection
In the previous subsection, unmatched rules' anomalies are defined and categorized. In this subsection, we will describe the detection method. However, for sake of brevity and due to space limitation, the pseudo-code is not presented here and can be found in [21] .
1) Invalid Rule Anomaly Detection:
The unmatched rules are checked based on Equation 16 to detect invalid anomalies. The result determines the rules that might never be matched by all possible queries. This type of anomaly usually occurs when a network administrator updates the network policy and forgets to remove part of the old rules from the same flow tables. For each unmatched rule, the algorithm tries to find a query that has an intersection with the unmatched rule in question. Whenever the function is unable find any intersecting query, the rule is moved to the invalid rules list.
2) Intra-Anomaly Detection: The intra-anomaly detection operation is executed after the removal of the invalid rules from the unmatched rule list. The conflicting rules together with the anomaly types are reported to the network administrator for making a decision. According to Equations 5 to 7, the Simple Anomaly Detection Function is defined. This function checks shadowing, generalization and correlation anomalies between the unmatched rule and each of its flow table's rules whenever the pair of rules have different actions. Moreover, according to Equation 8, the unmatched rule will be checked with the rules that have same action. The Total Anomaly Detection Function is defined to detect the total anomalies based on Equations 9 to 11. In the first step, the algorithm collects the rules that have lower priority from the unmatched rule and have partial intersection with it. Then, total generalization anomaly condition ( Equation 11) is checked for the part of collected rules that have different action than the unmatched rule. In addition, the total redundancy anomaly condition (Equation 10) is checked for the rest of the collection that has the same action as the unmatched rule. For the next part, rules with higher priority than the unmatched rule that partially overlap with it are collected. Then, total shadowing anomaly condition ( Equation 9) is checked for the part of collected rules that have different action from the unmatched rule. Subsequently, the rest of the rules, which have same action with the unmatched rule, are checked for the total redundancy anomaly condition (Equation 10).
3) Inter-Anomaly Detection: The inter-anomaly detection operation assumes that the flow tables are intra-anomaly free. The conflicting rules together with the detected anomaly types will be reported to the network administrator for making a decision. According to the detection algorithm, for each unmatched rule, all paths from all ingress switches are calculated by the transfer function. Then, each path is compared with the expected path, which is specified by the network administrator. If both paths are the same, then no inter-anomaly is reported. Whenever the paths are different, the Check Rule InterAnomaly Function will be called. Finally, according to Equation 15 , the irrelevant rule checking will be performed. The unmatched rule is declared as an irrelevant rule provided that the rule's host does not exist in any administrator's expected path. The Check Rule InterAnomaly Function aims to check and detect the anticipated anomalies between the unmatched rule and the rule that causes the conflict. Therefore, the rule that causes the difference between the query's path and the expected one is found. Then, the type of anomaly is further checked. The subset anomaly condition based on Equation 12 is checked between two rules. If it is not verified, the superset anomaly condition, which is represented by Equation 13, will be inspected. Finally, as per Equation 14 , the partial anomaly condition will be checked.
V. EVALUATION
In this Section, we evaluate the proposed method, which consists of four main phases: Test Query Generating, Probing Process, Intra-Anomaly Detection and Inter-Anomaly Detection. All methods are implemented in C++ and the experiments are run on a Ubuntu Virtual Machine, with only one core of the Intel core i3, 3.70 GHz CPU and 2GB of RAM.
A. Test Query Generating
In this subsection, the execution time of the test query generation process for different flow table sizes is evaluated. As illustrated by Table I and Fig. 4 , the execution time increases dramatically whenever the rule set size exceeds 5000 rules. 
B. Probing Process
For evaluating the probing process, a query, which contains ingress port, source IP, destination IP and destination port, is used. Content of OpenFlow switch tables are fetched by the dump command [22] , and then will be prepared by the parsing algorithm for the process. The parsing algorithm retrieves the Table II and Fig. 6 , the execution time as a function of the number of rules has an almost linear growth. 
C. Intra-Anomaly Detection
In this subsection, the execution time of the intra-anomaly detection is evaluated for different rule sets. By design, the execution time is independent of the type of the anomaly and numbers of detected anomalies. As observed in Table III and 
D. Inter-Anomaly Detection
As seen in Equation 12 to 15, the inter-anomaly detection resorts to the probing process. Therefore, the engine execution time follows the same pattern for a different rule number.
VI. CONCLUSION
SDN rules are usually updated in a dynamic manner, which leads to error prone policies. There have been some valuable studies on rule anomaly detection, however, those studies do not cope with multi-action Openflow rules. In this article, we provide comprehensive and generalized anomaly classification and detection methods for SDN that cover multi-action Openflow rules. Furthermore, we introduce the taxonomy: invalid and irrelevant anomalies for unmatched rules. An offline method is implemented based on the new definitions. The efficiency of our devised anomaly detection procedures are evaluated and the results are very promising. Our detection methods are embarrassingly parallel, which make them a viable solution for large network troubleshooting. As future work, we would like to quantify the gain in terms of execution time induced by the parallel nature of our algorithms.
